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INTRODUCTION
In the past five years, the world community has become
increasingly aware of the sea and its resources. Issues of the extent
of state jurisdiction and of the degree of authority of international
regimes have become the subject of intensive debate. The General
Assembly of the United Nations has created a special committee
for the bed of the sea.' Individual states are beginning to form
their positions. It is expected that the 1958 Geneva Conventions
on the Law of the Sea will soon be opened for new decisions
within an international arena.
Thus far, the debate has focused almost entirely upon the bed
of the sea and upon mineral resources and military interests. The
problems of international marine fisheries have either been
ignored or explicity rejected. But, if the Geneva Conventions are
opened for new decisions, the problems of fisheries will have to
be addressed.
The necessity for addressing problems of fisheries comes
primarily from the extreme difficulty of separating jurisdiction
over the bed of the sea from jurisdiction over the superjacent
waters. This difficulty derives both from the close
interrelationships between different uses of the same area of the
sea and from the fears (realistic or not) that rights over the bed
of the sea will migrate upwards and interfere with the freedom of
the seas on the surface. Furthermore, the necessity for addressing
fishery problems at the new conventions will also derive from the
growing interests of states in sharing in the distribution of the
sea's wealth in general-an interest that emerges from the
opportunity to share in the potential wealth of the seabed.
The raising of fishery issues as a kind of afterthought would
not be of much concern were it not for the importance of fisheries
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as a source of both international wealth and conflict. Among the
resources shared by the world community, fisheries are the only
ones of considerable economic importance-now and for many
years to come. Mineral exploitation has not yet gone beyond 200
meters in depth; neither for oil nor for the surficial deposits of
marigenous materials such as the phosphorite and manganese
nodules. The net worth of recoverable oil in these deep waters is
not likely to be great for many years to come. Even though there
may be abundant pools of oil, the costs of deep water extraction
are quite high and limit the net revenues that can be obtained. The
commercial extraction of the nodules is still highly speculative.'
But fisheries, beyond limits of present national jurisdiction,
have considerable economic value. Chapman has estimated that
gross revenues from the annual harvest of living marine resources
is on the order of nine billion dollars.3 He bases this on the
assumption of an average price of $166 per metric ton, which
appears to be excessive. In addition, his catch figures include
catch within national marine waters as well as within international
waters. Even so the fact remains that international marine
fisheries contain far greater economic wealth than any other
internationally shared resource.
Of equal importance, however, is the fact that fishing is one
of the few activities of man in which different states are in direct
confrontation with each other over the same resources. It is a
confrontation that is increasing rapidly in extent and severity and
it is becoming a major source of conflict in and of itself. No such
direct confrontation of enterprise can be anticipated for the
minerals of the seabed and subsoil-at least not for many years
to come.' Confrontation over military uses of the sea is restricted
to either a few parties or a few locations. The use of the sea for
disposal of wastes or as a sink for organicides and other toxic
materials is diffused and the damages are little known.- Nowhere
2. [Editor's Note] But ef Mero, A Legal Regime for Deep Sea Mining, 7 SAN DIEcO
L. REv. 488 (1970).
3. Chapman, Some Problems and Prospects for the Harvest of Living Marine
Resources to the Year 2000, at 1, April 1, 1970 (unpublished paper presented to a
UNITAR Symposium).
4. [Editor's Note] See Mero, A Legal Regime for Deep Sea Mining, 7 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 488 (1970).
5. [Editor's Note] See Note, Ocean Pollution: An Examination of the Problem and
an Appeal For International Cooperation, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 488 (1970).
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in the oceans is there a source of conflict so sustained and
prevalent as in the international use of marine fisheries.
And yet, in spite of the economic and political importance,
fishery problems are being dragged in by the back door, to face
decisions by diplomats who, for the most part, lack the requisite
interest and competence to solve such problems. It is because of
this that it seems timely and useful to raise a few points that
might be considered by those who are (presumably) preparing
themselves for the new conferences on the law of the sea. (1) The
problems of fisheries, because of both the centuries of use and the
recent, dramatic changes in enterprise, are inordinately complex.
However, the issues have not been precisely described and the
alternative resolutions have scarcely been formulated. (2) The
over-emphasis on the seabed may lead to short term gains for
those related interests at the cost of long term damages to the
world's interests in fisheries. (3) The character of today's decision-
making arena is far different from that of 1958. The fishery
diplomats will not be participating in a club of fishing states, but
in the context of a global interest in the wealth of the seas, in a
split between developed and developing states, and in the fears of
a United States-Soviet Union condominium. (4) There is
increasing awareness that the patterns of distribution among
nations of the sea's wealth in fisheries is becoming more and more
non-inclusive in nature, and that the opportunities for sharing are
more restricted. (5) These non-inclusive patterns of distribution
are supported by customary and conventional law. Non-inclusive
access to (though not distribution of) wealth is required for
efficiency in production. If there is to be more inclusive sharing
of wealth, then there is need for totally new institutions and law.
I. COMPLEXITY OF FISHERIES AND THE INADEQUACY OF
KNOWLEDGE
The complexity of fishery problems arises from natural,
political, and economic factors. One example may help to
indicate, in small part, some of these complexities. During the
past decade, it was discovered that there were great concentrations
of salmon off the east coast of Greenland. It was also found that
these salmon originate from streams on both sides of the Atlantic.
Commercially, it has been very profitable to take the salmon
during their stay off Greenland and as they begin their journey to
their spawning streams. But the salmon are also very valuable in
1970]
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recreational terms when they enter their spawning streams. Thus
a stock that swims freely between national and international
waters is sought by the fishermen of a number of different states
for quite different purposes.
In other instances, complicating factors include ecological
interrelationships between stocks, so that exploitation of one
affects the yield of another; economic inter-relationships between
different fisheries utilized by the same vessels; differences in
wage/price structures between fishermen taking the same stock;
the use of a stock by vastly different kinds of effort, ranging from
primitive dories to large, centrally-directed fleets of highly
specialized vessels, and many more contrasts that make the
difficulties of determining the "best use" almost intransigent.
In addition, fishing groups have historically formed many
and varied kinds of international arrangements. These have great
differences in degrees of authority, function, openness to new
members and kinds of regulations imposed. In some cases, the
same area of the sea may be governed by several different
international agreements and arrangements.
The problems and the difficulties of dealing with fisheries are
compounded by the international sharing of the resources and the
condition of open access. These serve to impede, or to reduce
incentives for state investment in scientific, economic, and
political science research. There are many competent and
dedicated marine biologists throughout the world, but their
governments may be reluctant to provide the necessary support
because the benefits may not accrue solely to the investing state.'
Yet there is still a great deal of biological knowledge that must
be obtained in order to improve management decisions.
Even though investment in biological research is insufficient,
it is still many times greater than the investments in social science
research. Fishery economists are few and far between and political
scientists familiar with fisheries are virtually non-existent.
6. The United States Bureau of the Budget has recently made a drastic cut in the
research funds of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries. This terribly short-sighted move
was made on the assumption that fishery research does not contribute much to the national
economy, and that the benefits of research are dissipated by the condition of open access.
While there is some rationale for the assumption, the cut is likely to be severely detrimental
to United States' interests. It will not only exacerbate the ill health of domestic fishing
industries, but will also severely damage the ability of the United States to prepare for
the reopening of the Geneva Conventions.
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Economists have been hampered because their research frequently
raises questions about the status of open access to fishery grounds.
Suggestions for closing fishery access are not popular because of
the implications for reduced employment opportunities, for the
imposition of taxes or license fees, for changes in the concept of
the freedom of the seas and for the distribution of the sea's
wealth. And, yet, only through the closing of access can fishing
become an economically rational enterprise.
7
While problems of international fisheries are both extremely
complicated and important, the knowledge required for dealing
with them effectively is grossly inadequate. At the reopening of the
Geneva Conventions, such questions as the following are likely to
be raised: How can access be closed in order to permit efficient
production? If access is to be closed, who is to be granted access?
How can the current trends towards non-inclusive distribution of
wealth be changed? What are the criteria for distribution? What
is the importance of historic rights, preferential rights of coastal
states and the principle of abstention? What are the alternative
arrangements and regulations that could be adopted, and how will
these affect the production and distribution of wealth? What are
the implications of new arrangements for other uses of the sea?
It is most unlikely that satisfactory answers to these
questions can be obtained prior to the reopening of the Geneva
Conventions. If decisions are forced in the absence of information,
the results may be damaging to the long run interests of the world
community.
II. UNDER-EMPHASIS ON FISHERIES
For a number of reasons, the current debate on the sea has
focused almost exclusively on the bed of the sea and on military
and mineral interests. In part, this is due to the technological
developments that have recently made deep water mining appear
to be a more commercially attractive proposition than before. A
good deal of publicity has been given to possible ventures for
mining deep sea manganese nodules. Oil companies have invested
sizeable funds in leases for areas well beyond 200 meters in depth.
7. See E. CHRISTY AND A. SCOTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN FISHERIES
(1965); The Management of Fishery Resources, THE STATE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
1967, FAO, Rome (1967); and Christy, The Distribution of the Sea's Wealth in Fisheries,
THE LAW OF THE SEA: OFFSHORE BOUNDARIES AND ZONES (L. Alexander ed. 1967).
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These potential exploitations have dramatized the inadequacy of
the 1958 Geneva Conventions.
In addition, the possible use of the bed of the sea for the
placement of military weapons was a strong motivation behind the
introduction of the issues into the United Nations by Malta's
Ambassador Pardo.8 Because of these potential military and
mineral developments, it is understandable that the mandate given
by the General Assembly to the special committee was restricted
to issues of the bed of the sea.
Another reason for this focus is that the issues concerning the
bed of the sea are far easier to draw than those for international
fisheries. The military and mineral interests are primarily
concerned with the limitations of coastal state jurisdiction. The
history of use is limited and has not, thus far, led to developments
and vested interests that would have to be changed (although this
is only apparently so with respect to military uses). In short, the
potential. gains and losses to these interests can be expressed with
relative clarity.
In fisheries, the situation is quite different. The issues and the
alternatives are not clear. In addition, it is not clear how interests
of different states would be affected by new seabed regimes that
might be adopted. Nor is it easily seen how the different interest
groups within the same state might be affected. Several states, for
example, have ambivalent positions with regard to the appropriate
limits of jurisdiction. Fishermen in distant water vessels, fishing
off the coasts of foreign states, would like to have as narrow limits
as possible. But their fellow nationals who fish in their own near
shore waters would like to have extensive limits to reduce the
competition from abroad.
As a consequence, the world is likely to re-open the Geneva
Conventions with heavy emphasis on military and mineral
interests and little weight directed to the interests of fishermen.
8. On August 17, 1967, Ambassador Arvid Pardo, Permanent Mission of Malta to
the U.N., introduced a Note Verbale into the General Assembly calling for an
"[e]xamination of the question of the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the
sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the sub-soil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the
limits of present national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in the interests of
mankind." 22 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967). This was followed by a major
statement by Ambassador Pardo in the U.N. First Committee on November 1, 1967. 22
U.N. GAOR provisional Does. A/c.I/PV. 1515, 1516.
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This is not to derogate the importance of peaceful and efficient
uses of the bed of the sea, but to suggest that the long term and
general interests in fisheries should be given much greater weight
in the, discussions, and to urge that they not be sacrificed to
achieve the more specialized and perhaps more ephemeral goals
of the military and mineral interests in the sea.
It should be noted that, at least within the United States, the
goals of the petroleum and military interests are not compatible.
Each, if realized, would have a differept effect on fisheries. The
petroleum interests desire wide limits of jurisdiction over the
seabed, extending out beyond the continental shelf, down the
slope, and to the landward portion of the continental rise.9 The
military interests of the United States call for as narrow limits as
possible, with respect to both the floor of the sea and the
superjacent waters. They feel that wide limits would threaten
freedom of mobility of submarines, surface vessels, aircraft, and
perhaps the placement of detection devices on the seabed. 10 Debate
within the United States governmental agencies is focused
primarily upon these two positions, with little attention being paid
to the possible effects on fishing.*
9. Petroleum Resources Under the Ocean Floor, National Petroleum Council
(Washington D.C. 1969).
-10. There are several implicit assumptions to the military position that have never
been fully examined. What, for example, is the United States national interest in freedom
of mobility? Does the Navy feel that it has to be able to send its forces anywhere at any
time to police the world? Or is it more concerned with specific areas in which maritime
commerce might be interrupted? To what extent would freedom of mobility be reduced by
the extension of jurisdiction for specialized purposes? If rights are extended simply for the
exploitation of seabed resources, would these necessarily lead to interferences with freedom
of navigation? Is freedom of mobility necessary through all waters? Or is it only certain
straits that are critical? If the latter, would it be possible to achieve the desired freedom
through other means than a generalized opposition to the extension of jurisdiction for any
and all purposes? Some of these same questions and other different ones have been raised
in a letter from Congressman Alton Lennon to President Nixon, April 7, 1970.
11. One exception to this is the advocacy of the military position by a spokesman
for United States distant water fishing interests. W.M. Chapman has stated that "over
the long run, ocean trade routes must be kept open to preserve the peace, even if it takes
war to do it." Hearings on U.N. Suboceanic Lands Policy Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
* After this article was written, President Nixon announced the United States
position on oceans policy (May 23, 1970). This calls for full jurisdiction over seabed
resources out to 200 meters and for an "international trusteeship zone" beyond that to
the edge of the continental margin. It also calls for an extension of the territorial seas to
12 miles.
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III. A NEW CONTEXT FOR DECISIONS
The interests of the dominant fishing states have been given
little challenge in the past. They have been able to work out
agreements and patterns of cooperation among themselves with
little exposure to the possible demands of non-fishing states and
non-fishing interests. In 1958, at the Geneva Conferences on the
Law of the Sea, most participants were willing to let the fishery
diplomats work out the agreements on fisheries as long as other
interests were not affected. Since 1958, many bilateral and
multilateral agreements have been made, but they have not been
exposed to world opinion.
In fact, fishery diplomacy is a unique area of international
relations. The fishery diplomats of the various states are well
known to each other because of their many common meeting
grounds in the negotiation of agreements, the continued work of
the commissions, and in their interaction in the international
agencies concerned with the sea. The scientists-turned-diplomats
who negotiate the agreements, unlike their foreign service
colleagues, have a highly specialized knowledge of the problems
and issues with which they deal. Generally, although not entirely,
they are able to operate without significant constraint in having
to meet other national interests.
The close relationship among the fishery diplomats, together
with their expertise and freedom, has facilitated the reaching of
agreements among the various states. But it has also tended to
drop curtains around the negotiations and to impede the
interventions of those who are not members of the club. It is
questionable whether or not this technocratic approach can be
maintained in the light of today's world interests.
While the issues before the United Nations have focused on
the bed of the sea, they have raised questions about the
distribution of the sea's wealth in general. For if the developing
states expect to share in the revenues of mineral exploitation, why
should they not expect to share in the wealth of fisheries? This
question is likely to be raised with increasing force as the patterns
of not including in the distribution of the sea's wealth those
nations who have failed to exercise their right to fish (noted below)
become more apparent. It is also likely to become more important




In addition to the awareness of wealth and the desire to share
in it, there are many other factors that serve to create a
significantly different context for negotiations than those that
operated in 1958. These include the greater number of states, the
greater sensitivity to the gap between developed and developing
states, the desires of the developing states to participate in the
decisions on management as well as in the wealth, and the
apprehensions about a United States-Soviet Union condominium.
In short, the fishery diplomats can expect a totally different
ball game than the ones in which they have participated in the
past. And for this, they will need a great deal of preparation as
well as an openness to new demands and new institutions.
IV. PATTERNS OF DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE SEA'S WEALTH IN
FISHERIES
It was stated above that the patterns of distribution of the
sea's wealth in fisheries tend to be non-inclusive in nature. The
acquisition of wealth can only be achieved through exercise of the
freedom to fish. Those who do not fish, acquire no shares in the
wealth, even though they may maintain their option to do so at
some time in the future.
This system of open access and the rule of capture could
continue without too much difficulty if there were plenty of fish
in the sea and plenty of opportunities for new states to exercise
their option to fish in the future. But these conditions do not exist
today. First, the supplies of desirable species are limited. Second,
there is little evidence that there has been a significant increase in
the number of nations that are increasing their shares of the world
catch. Third, with open access the advantages lie with those states
that are able to establish fleets that are mobile and highly
organized. Fourth, international agreements tend to impede the
entry of new states. Fifth, open access should be closed if there is
to be efficient production of wealth. These items are elaborated
in much greater detail in another paper and will be treated only
briefly here.12
The limitations on total catch of fish occur primarily from
the fact that man's demands are restricted to a few dozen of the
12. F. Christy, Jr., Fisheries: Common Property, Open Access, and the Common
Heritage, (Papers for Preparatory Conference on Legal Framework and Continental Shelf,
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, in press).
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thousands of species that live in the sea. Because of taste
preferences, demand patterns, difficulties of catching or preserving
certain species, most of the vast quantities of protein materials are
not used directly by man. These conditions can and do change
from time to time, but the changes are slow to occur.
It is true that total world catch of fish has increased at a high
rate over the past few decades-about 6 percent per year. But this
is a misleading figure, because the greater proportion of the
increase has been due to a phenomenal growth in demand and
supply of fish caught for fish meal. This has grown at a rate
greater than 12 percent per year, while fish caught for food
purposes has grown at less than 4 percent per year. Since it is
most unlikely that the former growth rate can be maintained (and
indeed, it already shows signs of slackening), it is unsafe to
extrapolate past trends into the future.
More directly, economic analyses of supply and demand
recently prepared for the FAO Indicative World Plan, signify not
only a diminution of rate of increase but also a tendency for
demand to outstrip supply so that there may actually be shortages
of supplies at current price levels. 13 These estimates are strongly
counter to the optimistic projections of Chapman and others
about the opportunities for expansion. 4
It has been maintained by some that the distribution of catch
has become much more inclusive in nature and that the trends
have been particularly favorable to the developing countries."1 But
this is not strongly supported by statistical evidence. Table 1,
below, shows patterns of catch in 1958 and 1968. It shows a
marked decline in the proportion of catch taken by the developed
market economies and a commensurate increase in the proportion
taken by the single state of Peru. For the test of the developing
market economies, the share of total catch has increased only
from 22 percent to 23 percent-hardly a significant gain.
To be sure, there are several developing states that are doing
quite well. Twenty of these, whose catch was more than one tenth
of one percent of total 1968 catch, have increased at rates greater
13. Indicative World Plan Unit, Department of Fisheries, The Prospects for World
Fishery Development in 1975 and 1985, FAO, Rome (1969).
14. See Chapman, supra note 3, at I.




Total Fisheries Catch as Percent of World Total
1958 1968
Developed Market Economies 52% 39%
Developing Market Economies,
excluding Peru 22% 23%
Peru 3% 16%
Centrally Planned Economies
(Communist Countries) 23% 22%
Total 100% 100%
Source: FAO, Yearbook of Fishery
Statistics 1968, Vol. 26
(Rome: FAO, 1968), Table A 1-0.
than for the world as a whole. But the total effect is still not very
significant. Even here, it can be questioned whether or not the
benefits have accrued to the states or to the foreign processing
firms that, in many instances, have invested in the increased
efforts."6
Perhaps a more significant indication of future patterns of
distribution of those stocks that are purely international in
character, lies in the number of vessels of more than 100 tons in
size. The number of these vessels, their aggregate tonnage, and the
proportion of tonnage are shown in Table 2. Almost half of these
fly the Soviet flag and another 30 percent come from a few
developed states. The rest of the states, both developed and
developing, share less than 20 percent of total tonnage.
It is generally the larger vessels that benefit most from the
conditions of open access. Their size generally gives them a
greater degree of mobility. When a stock, close to a coastal state,
becomes overfished, the mobile fleets can easily move off to other
stocks, whereas the local coastal fishermen in the smaller vessels
do not have the same opportunities.
In addition to the non-inclusive trends in patterns of catch,
there are also non-inclusive patterns in the international
16. See Scott, Fisheries Development and National Economic Development,
Proceedings of the Gulf and Caribbean Fisheries Institute, 18th Annual Session, Nov.
1965, at 335-45.
19701
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
TABLE 2
Number of Fishing Craft Over 100 Gross Tons by Slates
Tonnage as
State Number Tonnage % of Total
U.S.S.R. 2,908 3,410,000 49
Japan 2,125 890.000 13
Spain 1,289 400,000 6
U.K. 578 240,000 3
France 663 193,000 3
Norway 623 178,000 3
Poland 168 176,000 3
W. Germany 215 162,000 2
Other 3,400 1,300,000* 19*
Total 11,949 [sic] 7,000,000* [sic] 100 [sic]
*Estimated total tonnage given only as "less than seven million tons", so
these figures are approximate.
Source: "USSR has 382 Fishing Vessels Larger than 2,000 Tons," 8
FISHING NEWS INT'L, Dec. 1969, at 15. Estimates taken from Lloyd's
Register of Shipping Statistical Tables for 1969.
arrangements for -the management of stocks. These are perfectly
understandable-from the point of view of the fishing states.
Where management of a stock becomes necessary and some
control on the annual take has been instituted, the entry of new
comers can only mean that the signatories will be getting smaller
shares. The signatories will naturally attempt to resist new entry.
Such non-inclusive attempts can be found in claims to historic
rights in the establishment of national quota schemes, to
preferential rights, to the extension of limits of coastal state
jurisdiction, and in the advocacy of the doctrine of abstention.
While these cannot legitimately exclude non-signatories and those
who do not recognize extensive claims, they do, in fact, impede
the entry of new states.
Finally, and on a different order entirely, the condition of
open access inevitably leads to considerable economic waste in the
utilization of fisheries. This has been documented in a number of
studies. In the Northeastern Pacific, for example, it has been
[Vol. 7
NEW CONVENTIONS
estimated conservatively that the same annual catch (and gross
revenue) from salmon could be taken with $50 million worth of
less capital and labor than" are currently employed. 17 The
prevention of such waste can occur only through the establishment
of some controls over access. It does not mean, however, that
states cannot share in the wealth, because systems can be devised
whereby those who gain access- pay for the privilege and the
payments can be shared by those who are excluded.
But this last point is an item for the future, whereas the
former points demonstrate what is happening in the present. This
is a demonstration of strong trends towards non-inclusive patterns
of distribution of the sea's wealth in fisheries. Those who enter the
re-opening of the Geneva Conventions should be prepared either
to prove that these estimates of trends are incorrect or to suggest
alternatives that would be more inclusive in nature.
V. THE NEED FOR NEW PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Generally, the international law of the sea has evolved
gradually from customary and conventional law. Currently, this
leans heavily upon the principle of th freedom of the seas which
guarantees free and open access to all states. It is modified slightly
by the principles of historic rights, which gives some measure of
return to states which have participated in the-past, and by
preferential rights, which recognize the special interests of the
adjacent coastal states. All of these principles, however, tend to
support the non-inclusive patterns of distribution described above.
The only way in which the patterns can be changed to allow
for more inclusive patterns of distribution is to change the
principle that wealth can be acquired only through the exercise of
the right to fish. A totally new principle is necessary, and one for
which there is no precedent.
This principle will require the establishment of some form of
tax, license fee, lease system or auction whereby those who obtain
the rights to fish pay for the privilege and those who are excluded
share in the rents that are produced.
Theoretically, this principle is no different than one employed
in many states-where the users of public property such as
grazing lands and the oil resources of the continental shelf, pay
17. J. CRUTCHFIELD AND G. PONTECORVO, THE PACIFIC SALMON FISHERIES 174
(1969).
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the public for their rights of exploitation. Theoretically, it is also
an eminently logical scheme for international fisheries, for the
economic rent that could be produced is currently being dissipated
by open access and accrues to no one-neither the fishermen nor
society.
'In practice, however, there are considerable difficulties. Some
of these have been referred to already in the discussion of the
complexity of fishery problems. The others lie in changing the
course of international law and abandoning the concept that new
institutions can evolve gradually from those of the past. But there
is to be more inclusive sharing in the sea's wealth in fisheries, if
the concept of common heritage is to be given operational
meaning, then these difficulties will have to be overcome.
SUMMARY
The above five points have been raised because it is not at
all apparent that either the states of the world or their diplomats
are ready to deal with the fishery.issues that are likely to be raised
at the reopening of the Geneva Conventions. It is to be hoped
(though not expected) that the reopening can be delayed for at
least a few years. If this can be done, then it must also be hoped
that the delay could be accompanied by a tremendous increase in
study of the issues and alternative solutions.
Failing that, the states should at least be made aware of the
mare's nest'that is being opened by the sudden interest in the bed
of the sea and they should prepare themselves as best they can for
the complexity of the issues and the need for new international
institutions and arrangements.
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